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deduction for alimony if the payments claimed as a deduction are actually
made within seventy-five days of the close of the taxpayer's fiscal or
calendar year, whichever is used. A deduction claimed by a cash basis
taxpayer for the transfer of property or lump sum payment must be
taken in the income year in which the transfer of property or lump sum
payment is effected. No deduction may later be claimed if not taken
in that year. But if the taxpayer uses the accrual basis for reporting
income the deduction for lump sum payments or transfer of property
may be claimed on the accrual basis and no subsequent deduction shall
be allowed.
HUNTER DALTON HEGGiE.
Taxation-Income-Gain from Sale of Land with
Growing Crops
Cases involving taxation of gain from the sale of land upon which
there are growing crops are recent and in conflict. It seems odd that
the tax consequences of such a sale have not been previously settled with
finality. The basic facts are simple. Taxpayer is a farmer engaged in
growing crops for sale at maturity. He sells land which he has owned
for more than six months upon which there is an immature crop. Tax-
payer reports his gain as a capital one within §117(j) of the Internal
Revenue Code.1
Section 117(j) is a relief provision which allows gain from the sale
of certain business property, not otherwise considered as a capital asset,
to be taxed as a capital gain. To come within this section, the taxpayer
must establish that the property sold was (1) used in his trade or
business; (2) real estate or property subject to an allowance for de-
preciation; (3) held for more than six months; (4) not property
includible in inventory; and (5) not held primarily for sale to custom-
ers in the ordinary course of trade or business.
The Bureau ruled in 19462 that upon the sale of a citrus grove hav-
ing immature fruit on the trees, a portion of the sale price must be
allocated to the growing fruit and the gain therefrom taxed as ordinary
income. The balance, attributable to the land and trees, was ruled to
be a capital gain within §117(j). A majority of the Tax Court has
followed this ruling, holding that upon the sale of either an orange
grove3 or land containing an immature wheat crop,4 an allocation must
be made on the basis of the fair market value of the growing crop at
I See Hill, Ordinary Income or Capital Gain on the Sale of an Orange Grove,
4 MIAmi L. Q. 145 (1950), written prior to the cases commented upon here.
2 1. T. 3815, 1946-2 Cum. BU.L. 30.
3 Earnest A. Watson, 15 T. C. 104 (1950).
'Thomas J. McCoy, 15 T. C. 106 (1950).
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the time of the sale. A federal district court has held to the contrary
that the entire gain from sale of a citrus grove is one within the pur-
view of §117(j). 5
The district court followed §117(j) closely, finding compliance with
each of the statutory requisites.6 The Tax Court, however, held (2)
and (5) listed above were not established. Thus the conflict between
the two courts may be reduced to two issues: (1) Are the growing
crops to be considered part of the real estate? (2) Are such crops held
primarily for sale in the ordinary course of taxpayer's business?
In holding for taxpayer, the district court ruled the unripe fruit on
the trees to be part of taxpayer's realty, since under applicable state
law it was considered as such. The Tax Court, however, held the
status of growing crops under state law immaterial, as the character of
income must be determined solely by reference to the taxing act.
Growing crops are treated variously in the several states as realty
and personalty, depending on the nature of the transaction and character
of the crops.7 The courts tend to treat unsevered annual crops as per-
sonalty, and perennials, such as growing fruit, as part of the realty. It
is well established that the federal tax laws are intended to be uniform
throughout the nation.8 The federal statute should be the criterion;
technical concepts of state property law should not control in this
situation. Such a sale should have the same consequences taxwise in
all states.
The question remains as to the status of the growing crops. The
Internal Revenue Code does not define the term "real estate." Thus
the words of the statute should be interpreted in their ordinary every-
day sense,' 0 keeping in mind the purposes of the statute. In common
parlance, real estate does not mean growing crops. Practically speaking
such crops are a factor apart from the land in determining the sale
price, and should be considered separately for tax purposes. Although
there are differences under state law, whether the growing crop is of
the annual or perennial type should not be of significance taxwise. In
either case, had the crop been harvested, the gain would have been
ordinary income.
'Irrgang v. Fabs, 94 F. Supp. 206 (S. D. Fla. 1950). This case has been
appealed by the Government to the U. S. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit.
'In Irrgang v. Fahs, supra note 5, the court referred incidentally to the fact
that the immature fruit had its beginning more than six months prior to the date
of sale. This was held immaterial, as the fruit is part of the tree; the holding
period of the trees was said to be controlling.
7 See Note, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1219 (1910) ; 25 C. 3. S. §1; 8 R. C. L. 356.
'See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 194 (1938) ; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S.
103, 110 (1932).
9 If it is not so held, a farmer having portions of his farm in two states
obtains a tax saving by selling land with crops thereon in one state rather than
the other, because of differences in local law.'0See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, 6 (1946).
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The district court reasoned the unripe fruit was not being held by
taxpayer for sale in the ordinary course of his business, as his business
was the selling of mature fruit. To the contrary, the Tax Court held
that, although the fruit was sold prior to maturity along with the land,
the form of the transaction does not change the fact that the fruit was
being held by taxpayer for sale in the ordinary course of his business.
It is difficult to see how it can be reasoned that the crops were not
held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business. It is true
taxpayer was in the business of selling mature fruit. But are crops any
less "heldr by him primarily for sale because sold prior to maturity?
Common sense and reason would suggest they are not. The mere form
and time of the transaction should not control." The crops are the only
thing taxpayer is holding for sale in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness. Effecting their sale prior to maturity along with the land should
not change the nature of his holding.
One might argue that the words of the statute do not authorize
allocation of the sale price for purposes of taxation. This is literally
true, as the statute speaks in terms of business property as a unit. How-
ever, when the statute was drafted, it is doubtful whether this situation
was contemplated. Keeping in mind the economic realities of the situ-
ation, it seems a reasonable construction of the statute to require allo-
cation. Generally a farmer deducts the costs of raising his crops as
ordinary business expenses. He should not be allowed to convert his
profit into a capital gain by effecting their sale immediately prior to
maturity along with the land.
MASON P. THOMAS, JR.
Torts-Misrepresentation-Requisite of Scienter
Defendant's agent, admittedly acting within the scope of his employ-
ment, falsely represented to plaintiff that the house which plaintiff was
buying from defendant was constructed of brick veneer. Plaintiff re-
lied on this representation and was thereby induced to make the pur-
chase. The house in fact was built of "speed brick," an inferior type
of construction. At the close of plaintiff's evidence the court granted
a nonsuit on the ground that there was no proof of scienter. Held,
new trial granted. ". . . a false representation positively made by one
who ought in the discharge of his duty to have known the truth and
who is consciously and recklessly ignorant whether it be true or false,
may be regarded as fraudulent when made to induce a sale and reason-
ably relied on by the vendee."'
"' Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U. S. 504 (1948).
1 Atfinson v. Charlotte Builders, Inc., 232 N. C. 67, 68, 59 S. E. 2d 1 (1950).
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